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Abstract. In this paper we try to place the phenomenon of ﬁ-
nancial matching in the broader context of ﬁnancial economics.
We explore the conceptual links with collateral, leverage, role of
capital in ﬁnancial intermediaries and non-ﬁnancial corporations,
the risk-shifting between the ﬁnancial and the non-ﬁnancial sec-
tors, and public policy implications. A broader research agenda is
outlined. Although this is a far cry from a survey, we summarized
two paradigms of ﬁnancial economics which can buttress this en-
deavor. Finally, we prepared a small analytical example to analyze
ﬁnancial matching in a corporate governance setting.
Sumario (espa˜ nol): Este documento intenta colocar el fen´ omeno
de los calces y descalces en los balances en el contexto m´ as amplio
de la econom´ ıa ﬁnanciera. Se exploran sus v´ ınculos conceptuales
con las garant´ ıas, el apalancamiento, el rol del capital propio en los
intermediarios ﬁnancieros y las empresas no ﬁnancieras, las trans-
ferencias de riesgos entre los sectores ﬁnancieros y no ﬁnancieros,
y las implicaciones para las pol´ ıticas p´ ublicas. De ah´ ı una am-
plia agenda de investigaci´ on es esbozada. Sin intentar hacer una
revisi´ on exhaustiva de la literatura, se presentan dos paradigmas
de la econom´ ıa ﬁnanciera que pueden respaldar dicha agenda. Fi-
nalmente, se expone un peque˜ no ejemplo anal´ ıtico de los calces
ﬁnancieros en el marco de un modelo de gobierno corporativo.
Introduction
Financial matching is a widely used tool in asset-liability manage-
ment (ALM) to coordinate characteristics such as denomination and
maturity of both sides of a balance sheet so as to reduce illiquidity
or insolvency risks
1. It is a widespread practice mainly in thinly cap-
italized ﬁnancial intermediaries like banks, insurance companies, and
deﬁned beneﬁt pension funds. In case of bonds and loans portfolios
matching ﬁxed/ﬂoat interest rates terms and optionality ingredients
(prepayment, rollover, commitments, etc.) may become very crucial as
well.
Financial mismatches have been at the heart of major ﬁnancial crises
in developed countries (e.g. Savings & Loans in the US 1980s) as
Date: December 2002. Draft 1.
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1See de La Grandville [2001] and Elton-Gruber [1995].
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well as in the stream of emerging market economies collapses since
1980s. Only more recent academic work on the latter episodes has given
an important macro role to currency and debt maturity mismatches,
e.g., Caballero-Krishnamurthy [2002], C´ espedes-Chang-Velasco [2002],
Chamon [2002], Hausmann[2001], Holmstr¨ om-Tirole [2002], and Tirole
[2002a, 2002b].
We attempt to place ﬁnancial matching more explicitly and centrally
on the broad canvas of ﬁnancial economics, and to model it in line
with the most recent formulation of corporate ﬁnance with its focus on
governance issues: Holmstr¨ om-Tirole [1996, 1997, 1998, 2001, 2002],
and Tirole [2001, 2002a, 2002b]. The organization of the paper is as
follows: in the ﬁrst section, without attempting any survey, we lay the
ground for the connections between matching and other related issues
in ﬁnance, next we place exogenous constraints on the environment of
a GE model of an incomplete market economy for a primary approach
of the relation between collateral and matching, and last we end up
with a exploratory corporate governance model of ﬁnancial matching.
1. Financial matching: related issues
It seems to make sense that matching is more likely to take place
in highly leveraged ﬁrms like ﬁnancial intermediaries than in the less
leveraged non-ﬁnancial sector. As the practitioner Matten [2000] notes,
capital in banks, unlike non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, fulﬁlls a negligible role
as a funding source. A bank loaning out a sizeable fraction of its
capital would be rated as poor manager of its equity base. There is
little question that prevalent and ever increasing regulatory capital
adequacy ratios are a binding constraint reluctantly tolerated by the
major international players of the banking industry. Bank equity is
best viewed as a buﬀer or cushion against losses.
Although our understanding of ﬁrms and hence ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries is still limited to either a technology or an owner managed unit,
modern corporate ﬁnance have made a well established inroad on the
implications of informational or contractual imperfections for the work-
ings of capital and credit markets and the governance of ﬁrms
2. The
central lesson is that entrepreneurs can pledge strictly less than the
full surplus of any project; therefore, investment by non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms
and ﬁnancial intermediaries is wealth constrained by collateral or eq-
uity, and credit is then rationed. A conjecture we will explore later on
is matching as a device to economize equity.
2Amaro de Matos [2001] is a good general text; Holmstr¨ om-Tirole [1997] and
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Asset transformation is the oldest academic rationale, albeit not the
most fashionable, for ﬁnancial intermediation in the economy
3. The
intermediary is rewarded to bear the risks of some mismatches, which
would be hard avoid or hedge for its customers on both sides of the
balance sheet in a direct ﬁnance scheme. Notice that there is some
tension, with public policy relevance, between intermediation vis a vis
direct ﬁnance and the exploitation of matching strategies. We will
come back to this.
Depositary institutions furnish the best known traditional exam-
ples of asset transformations: liquidity and maturity transformations.
Banks lend long term and take funds short term. Depositors free them-
selves (to a large extent) from interest rate risk. Banks get compensa-
tion from bearing the systematic risk part of ﬂuctuations of the term
structure of interest rates in this maturity transformation. In this par-
ticular case banks claims on its debtors and depositors claims diﬀer
in liquidity, and thus liquidity transformation goes hand in hand with
maturity transformation. The liquidity creation by banks hinges on the
lack of loans secondary markets and the strong optionality of deposits
redeemable on demand.
The stronger reliance ﬂoating rate loans, and the standardization
credit risk transfers in credit derivative markets, diminish a great deal
the eﬀective liquidity and maturity transformation that intermediaries
are undertaking. While in the credit derivative markets the depository
institution’s counterpart is a sophisticated well hedged ﬁnancial oper-
ator, ﬂoating rate loans, as a sequence of short term loans, are likely
to mismatch some balance sheets of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Thakor [1994]
points out that the clear trend of intermediaries reduction mismatches
is uncovering as their true function the accumulation of informational
capital and monitoring on debtors. Volatile interest rates may o may
not account for this, according to the perspective assumed: partial or
general equilibrium. Maturity mismatches may have been discouraged
from the ﬁrst perspective, but the eﬀect is ambiguous from the second
one. Finally, observe that mismatches of this sort may play an incen-
tive role to ensure that intermediaries do not shirk in its monitoring
tasks.
What about matching and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms? A possible striking
answer is Hessen [1994] intriguing and thought provoking remark that
“corporations” are a special type of “informal” intermediary where
shareholders and bondholders ﬁnance a managers and workers as a
coalition of borrowers. Controversy aside, we think that heavier regu-
lation on formal ﬁnancial intermediaries set them meaningfully apart.
3We put aside here “brokers”, agents who facilitates other people’s transactions
without altering tha nature of assets traded. See the very recent survey by Gorton
[2002], the textbook Freixas-Rochet [1997], and Thakor [1994].4 EDUARDO SIANDRA
There is little question that a non-ﬁnancial corporation may fulﬁll
a role of intermediary as to the management of its employees’ deﬁned
beneﬁt pension funds. But what about in their most general line of
business? The seminal paper of Myers [1977] on the problem of un-
derinvestment, i.e., the loss of proﬁtable real investment opportunities
because of outstanding ﬁnancial obligations, incidentally pointed out
a role for maturity matching of real investment and debt funding to
overcome it. We think, however, that a much lower leverage and the
usual presence of “real assets in place” readily available for collateral
often takes from non-ﬁnancial corporate scene matching as a large scale
balance sheet management principle.
In absence of “real assets in place”, sometime part of a ﬁrm assets
or a project generate highly predictable and stable cash ﬂows which
can collateralize the issue of carefully designed ﬁnancial instruments
4.
That is an instance of smaller scale asset-liabilities matching known as a
“structured ﬁnance”. This is akin to the linear programming approach
of cash ﬂows matching in bond management. In occasions, the concern
is only to immunize a positive net asset position, and the more ﬂexible
duration matching is used
5.
We think useful to go over the central points discussed here for the
rest of the paper:
(1) Financial matching is related to the extent of leverage.
(2) Financial matching functions diﬀerently in ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries and in non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
(3) The distribution of “matches” and “mismatches” in the ﬁnan-
cial and non ﬁnancial sectors is bound to have public policy and
regulatory implications.
(4) Availability and demand for collateral, liability and security
design, and ﬁnancial matching are all intertwined.
2. A quasi-security market economy
Here we review the bare bones of the simplest and most general
model economy used as a foundation of the arbitrage free pricing in
ﬁnancial economics according to the textbook presentation of LeRoy-
Werner [2001]. The intention here is to place ﬁnancial matching in rela-
tion with tradeable and non-tradeable claims and collateral. Although
the environment is not meant to introduce “imperfections” directly,
it is relatively easy to include exogenous restrictions on the menu of
tradeable assets and transaction costs such as short-sales constraints
and bid-ask spreads.
The environment and important notation are as follows:
4Of course, central theories of security design in corporate ﬁnance have to do with
many aspects from signaling private information (Flannery [1986]) to the exercise
on investors’ control rights (Tirole [2001])
5See de La Grandville [2001] and Elton-Gruber [1995].THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCIAL MATCHING 5
(1) Population is ﬁnite, there is only one good, S public states of
nature, and two periods t = 0,1.
(2) There are J securities (publicly tradeable assets), whose payoﬀ
J × S matrix X. We assume rank(X) = J, i.e., there are no
redundant assets. Examples of securities are bonds and shares.
Bilateral and tailor made ﬁnancial contracts such as bank loans,
insurance contracts, and over the counter ﬁnancial instruments
are not securities. Without loss of much generality xj ≥ 0 for
each row j6, i.e., all securities are “limited liability”. Only the
seller party has obligations in date 1, and the buyer limits his
or her losses to the date 0 investment.
(3) An asset j will be normally represented by row vector xj =
[xjs] ∈ RS. Asset trading takes place at prices pj at t = 0,
and delivery of xjs takes place in period t = 1 after state s
unravels. Since the menu of assets is by assumption “limited
liability”, arbitrage free security prices can never be zero or
negative (pj > 0).
(4) A portfolio is a detail of J asset holdings represented by a vector
h ∈ RJ. The cost of a portfolio is the inner product ph, where
p ∈ RJ.
(5) The portfolio payoﬀ is
P
j hjxj = hX ∈ RS. The asset span
of X, the set of all payoﬀs that can be achieve by trading, is
denoted by the set
M = {z ∈ R
S : z = hX for some h ∈ R
J}
(6) Consumption at t = 0 is c0 ∈ R+, and at t = 1 is c1 ∈ RS
+. For
dated endowment: w0 ∈ R++ and w1 ∈ RS
++
(7) For every agent i, we have a strictly increasing and quasi-
concave utility function ui : R
S+1
+ → R, more often denoted
by ui(c0,c1). Nothing very speciﬁc is said about either time
preference, but risk aversion for a given date 0 consumption is
implied quasi-concavity.
(8) An economy is the set E = {(ui,(wi
0,wi
1)) : i = 1,2,...,I}.
We often drop the individual index when the context is clear
enough.
The description encompasses both a complete asset market economy
(rank(X) = S) and an incomplete one (rank(X) 6= S).
A competitive equilibrium for the economy E is a vector of asset
prices p and consumption and portfolio allocation (ci
0,ci
1,hi) such that





6We follow the standard convention for vector inequalities xj ≥ 0 means xjs ≥ 0
for all s with at least one inequality strict.6 EDUARDO SIANDRA
subject to


























Existence of an equilibrium is not an issue under given the rather min-
imalist assumptions made, though determinancy of real allocation is a
problem under incomplete markets7. Full Pareto optimality is achieved
under complete asset markets, but it fails generally in the incomplete
market case.
The notion of arbitrage free pricing is central in ﬁnancial economics,
and the previous model aﬀords a natural habitat for its deﬁnition and
foundation.
An arbitrage opportunity (a “free lunch”) at asset prices p is a port-
folio h for ph ≤ 0 and hX ≥ 0 with at least one of the S+1 inequalities
being strict. In other words, an arbitrage opportunity is a limited li-
ability portfolio at zero or negative cost . The previously described
equilibrium rules out arbitrage opportunities. Conversely, if p is arbi-
trage free, loosely speaking it is an equilibrium price vector of some
economy E.
If p is arbitrage free, every Arrow-Debreu s contingent claim, i.e.,
one which pays one unit of the good if Nature chooses s and nothing
otherwise, has a positive value, called ”state price” qs. If asset markets
are complete, qs is unique and strictly positive. Otherwise, the state
prices are only positive and no longer unique.
The most important implication of arbitrage free pricing is the ex-
istence of a positive linear valuation functional q : RS → R. If asset
markets are complete, the functional is unique. In case of incomplete-
ness, the market can be completed one step at a time and extend the
linear valuation functional in a consistent fashion.
In the incomplete asset market case it is common to assume date 1
consumption endowments wi
1 are in the asset span of X (denoted here
by M). We would like to allow wi
1 6∈ M for some agents, i.e., their
endowment cannot be bundled as a tradeable portfolio. For this reason
we took the freedom to speak of a “quasi-security market economy”,
otherwise we would do it without the “quasi”.
7Equilibrium allocations under incomplete markets with an abstract unit of ac-
count has S − 1 degree of freedom. One way of lifting the indeterminancy is set-
ting the contingent quantity of money. See Geanakoplos [1990] and Magill-Quinzii
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A feature of any equilibrium of this type of economy is that every
agent honor his or her promises. A net debtor obtains date 0 funding
through short-selling of some securities to the extent of holding a neg-
ative cost portfolio (ph < 0)8. Then it must be the case that, al least
for some state of nature k, the portfolio must deliver net repayments P





hjxjk + wk ≥ ck ≥ 0.
That is, the net commitments cannot exceed the contingent endowment
wk. Eventual state contingent portfolio liabilities are collateralized or
matched by state contingent resources. In an alternative presentation,
let us set the liability side with short position holdings hl = −hj if
hj < 0, and the asset side with long position holdings ha = hj is







hlxls for all s.
To wit, all contingent liabilities are matched by initial holdings ws and
asset portfolio payoﬀs.
In Geanakoplos [1996] and Dubey-Geanakoplos-Shubik [2000, 2002]
version of this model with endogenous default, inﬁnite punishment triv-
ially enforce promises as in equations 2.1 and 2.2.
By assumption security trading is mired by neither informational
asymmetries or enforcement problems. However, a possible explanation
of asset incompleteness and non-tradeable contingent personal endow-
ment bundles may lay in one or another imperfection assumed away.
Let p be a vector of arbitrage free prices, and pick a likely debtor
because w0 = 0 and w1 ≥ 0. Suppose the future endowment w1 cannot
be bundled in a portfolio of securities (w1 6∈ M). How can we value
w1? First we can try to ﬁnd matching portfolios h` and hu such that
h`X ≤ w1 ≤ huX.
One or both portfolios may not exist. We will see how to handle this.
Second, we deﬁne a lower and an upper bound for the non-tradeable
endowment as the result of two linear programming problems:
q`(w1) = max
h
{ph : w1 ≥ hX}, (2.3)
qu(w1) = min
h
{ph : w1 ≤ hX}. (2.4)
These bounds extends naturally to any payoﬀ z ∈ RS. If the payoﬀ
proﬁle is achievable by security trading (z ∈ M), then q`(z) = qu(z) =
q(z). Otherwise, q`(z) < qu(z). If feasible sets are empty, it is a
convention to set q`(z) = −∞ and qu(z) = +∞.
8Recall we assumed limited liability securities.8 EDUARDO SIANDRA
A trivial example: There is only one available security, X = (1,1)
with p = 1, and the non tradeable endowment is w1 = (w11,w12) with
0 ≤ w11 < w12. Hence
q`(w1) = max
h
{h : (w11,w12) ≥ (h,h)} = w11,
qu(w1) = min
h
{h : (w11,w12) ≤ (h,h)} = w12.
When portfolios h` and hu exist, we express their optimality with
the notation h` ∈ argmaxh{ph : w1 ≥ hX} and hu ∈ argminh{ph :
w1 ≤ hX}.
Equations 2.3 and 2.4 deﬁne a meaningful metric to match portfolio
to payoﬀ proﬁle: 2.4 says choose to purchase a minimum cost portfolio
to ensure a liability proﬁle w1 could be met, and 2.3 says choose a
maximum value portfolio committing payments fully collateralized by
w1. The answers would be the same if w1 belongs to the asset span.
The point is that these are instances of common procedures to cash
ﬂow matching portfolios in bond management9.
LeRoy-Werner [2001] shows that equations 2.3 and 2.4 can be ex-




{qw1 : p = Xq},
qu(w1) = max
q≥0
{qw1 : p = Xq}.
The previous example is conﬁrmed:
q`(w1) = min
q≥0
{q1w11 + q2w12 : 1 = q1 + q2} = w11,
qu(w1) = max
q≥0
{q1w11 + q2w12 : 1 = q1 + q2} = w12.
It is clear here that matching non-tradeable assets with securities is
here a methodological tool for valuation. In this vein, we pointed out
the parallelism practical managerial techniques of cash ﬂow matching.
Collateralization of obligations is built in the equilibrium, but there is
no explicit threat contract breach.
As expected, if we tilt the endowment proﬁle towards lower current
level and higher future ones in a balanced way as to keep the budget set
or the optimal utility constant, “leverage” could rise but consumption
allocation will change little, at least in the utility metric. It would
be diﬃcult here to replicate a relation between matching and and the
perils of excessive leverage.
A model with no ﬁrms, ﬁnancial intermediaries, bilateral contracts,
etc. is not likely to be a good home to discuss some of the issues
highlighted at the end of Section 1. With market incompleteness and
9See Elton-Gruber [1995].THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCIAL MATCHING 9
idiosyncratic endowments there seems to be much room for person-
alized contracts, ﬁnancial innovation, and intermediation. Interest-
ing elaborations in such direction are Geanakoplos [1996] and Dubey-
Geanakoplos-Shubik [2000, 2002] accommodating endogenous default
and demand for collateral, and Pesendorfer [1995] on ﬁnancial interme-
diation and innovation.
3. A corporate finance approach
Some of the central issues posited at the end of Section 1 are best
dealt in a general equilibrium framework: risk shifting mismatches be-
tween the ﬁnancial and non ﬁnancial sectors, and the relation between
asset transformation and ﬁnancial innovation. However, informational
and enforcement problems and incentives are at the heart of this ﬁnan-
cial policy issue, and for this bilateral contractual models of modern
corporate ﬁnance are very appropriate.
We will follow especially Holmstr¨ om-Tirole [1997], Tirole [2001], and
their other related work. The ﬁrst step is to reformulate the story
of Siandra [2001] in a more complete framework. From this point we
introduce ﬁnancial intermediaries and try to draw some germane im-
plications to the points raised in Section 1.
Siandra [2001] contains a moral hazard model of stylized risk neutral
“ﬁrms” which make a choice between two projects: the bad one has
lower expected return and riskier cash ﬂow than the good one. But
the former has a very large and unlikely cash ﬂow if successful, whilst
the latter has a small but more likely lower payoﬀ if successful. A
type of project has foreign denominated cash ﬂows payoﬀs, and an-
other domestically denominated ones. However, either project can be
ﬁnanced in any currency. There are foreign and domestic lenders, and
the paper consider risk neutral and risk averse investors. There are two
interesting outcomes:
(1) Funding currency choice may compound the moral hazard prob-
lem by mismatching.
(2) When lenders are risk averse, it may be possible that they do
match their balance sheets, but ﬁrms do not. This has been
often the case in emerging market crises since 1980s.
The term “currency” should not be interpreted too literally, since mo-
tivation of money in economic modelling is still in shaky grounds. The
interpretation of production of traded and non-traded goods, and the
relative price of them as real exchange rate will do the job perfectly
well here.
3.1. A minimalist model. Tirole [2001] presents the basic agency
problem between investors and entrepreneur-manager (insiders) is a
particularly simple moral hazard example. None of the conclusions10 EDUARDO SIANDRA
however depends on choosing moral hazard as the basic incentive prob-
lem: adverse selection, non-veriﬁable project cash ﬂows, or incomplete
contracts yield similar implications.
An entrepreneur has a project which needs external ﬁnance. There
is no intermediation, to wit, all ﬁnance is direct. The “game” has three
stages:
Financing: The project requires an investment of I, entrepreneur’s
equity (“inside equity”) is A < I, and external funding de-
manded is I − A.
Hidden action: The entrepreneur can exert high eﬀort and make
the project success probability high, pH > 0, getting no private
beneﬁt, or low eﬀort for a success probability 0 < pL < pH
obtaining a private beneﬁt of B > 0.
Outcome: There is a veriﬁable proﬁt of R > 0 if successful or 0
otherwise.
The entrepreneur has limited liability, no party discounts the future,
and all are risk neutral. To make things concrete, assume the project
is socially worth funding, i.e., has positive NPV if the entrepreneur
chooses high eﬀort:
pHR − I > 0 > pLR + B − I.
The optimal compensation scheme for the entrepreneur-manager is a
remuneration w in case of success making more advantageous choosing
high eﬀort:
(pH − pL)w ≥ B.
We set the notation ∆p ≡ pH − pL, and then w∆p ≥ B. At most,
investor can expect to get R − B/∆p keeping the right incentives for
insiders. The necessary and suﬃcient condition for the external funding
to be channelled is that the pledgeable income (PI) has to be enough







≥ I − A.
With perfectly competitive investors and equality should be achieved.
Therefore, the project net surplus is equal the entrepreneur’s net sur-
plus: pHw − A = pHR − I.
Two main lessons are
Credit rationing: If equity A = 0, then it is possible that a
positive NPV project cannot be ﬁnanced







Inside equity: Entrepreneurs’ net worth matters for external fund-
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Whilst the foregoing was about direct ﬁnance, ﬁnancial intermedia-
tion can be accommodated here. It is well known that intermediated
ﬁnance is more expensive than direct one. The new thinking on inter-
mediation revolves around the idea of costly active monitoring10. With
a ﬁxed c it is possible for the intermediary to reduce the private beneﬁt
from B to b. In general the entrepreneur will no be very happy, for his
or her payoﬀ diminishes: pHR − I > pHR − I − c > 0. But if his or







< I − A,







− c ≥ I − A.
In other words, pledgeable income could be higher with the partici-
pation of the intermediary. In turn, the latter is obviously subject to
moral hazard vis a vis its last term investors, but we do not have here a
generally neat solution. But below, we provide one in our application.
3.2. Asset-liability denomination matching and inside equity.
Here we extend the model of the previous Subsection to get insights into
the link between capitalization or inside equity and ﬁnancial matching
as a risk management strategy. In particular we want to make the
private beneﬁts endogenous in a meaningful way for our application.
The analysis of matching denomination of liabilities and project cash
ﬂows is easier, but highly empirically relevant, as the stream of emerg-
ing market economies crises illustrate.
There are two goods, which the reader can think as one tradeable T
and another non-tradeable N, and thus take an international ﬁnancial
analogue.
There is a group of foreign and another of domestic risk neutral in-
vestors, both perfectly competitors. Each group has a perfect storage
technology as an outside opportunity in its own “country”, a tanta-
mount of interest rate zero or no discounting. The ﬁnance supply is
inﬁnitely elastic at those rates.
The “real exchange rate” is deﬁned as the relative price of tradeable
goods in terms of non-tradeable ones. In the ﬁnancing stage the ex-
change rate is one-to-one, and when the project outcome is learnt, the
real exchange rate can be e+ with probability π or e− with probability
1 − π. We assume
0 < e− < 1 < e+.
Generically, ˜ e stands for the ex ante level of exchange rate. Further,
each class of investors has access to other class’ storage technology.
Thus the uncover interest parity obtains: E(˜ e) = πe+ + (1 − π)e− =
10See Freixas-Rochet [1997] and Gorton [2002].12 EDUARDO SIANDRA
1. In a world with currencies the event ˜ e = e+ is a depreciation of
domestic currency, and ˜ e = e− is an appreciation. Lastly, exchange
rate variability is independent of project success probabilities.
The typical entrepreneur faces the following choice: the good project
produces jointly one unit of T and one unit of N with a probability
p > 1/2, and the bad project one unit of T or one unit of N. The
latter furnish the opportunity to misrepresent the nature of the good
produced and pocket the diﬀerence. Thus, he or she can always claim
having the lower valued good: mismatching is just plain embezzlement.
Although a bit extreme, Akerlof [1993] argues strongly its relevance.
Suppose in the bad technology the entrepreneur produces T, and
the real exchange is up. Although he or she has e+ > 1 worth of N,
his or her claim is that Nature only gave one unit of N. Thus, he or
she pockets a diﬀerence of e+ − 1 with a probability π/2. A similar
argument when producing N, leads to a gain of 1−e− with a probability
(1 − π)/2. The total private expected private beneﬁt is
(e+ − 1)π + (1 − e−)(1 − π)
2
= (1 − e−)(1 − π) = (e+ − 1)π,
using the fact that the expected real exchange is one.
We assume that the good project is the only socially eﬃcient
2p − I > 0 > 1 + (1 − e−)(1 − π) − I.
Let w be the “bribe” for the entrepreneur to choose the good project,
and to prevent the use of the excuse of mismatching to “go for broke”:
(p − 1/2)w ≥ (1 − e−)(1 − π).








and the condition for a project to get external ﬁnance for an en-




(1 − e−)(1 − π)
p − 1/2

≥ I − A.
Notice that the extent of moral hazard is lower as e− → 1− and π →
1−. Taking the ﬁrst limit implies e+ → 1+, i.e., lower real exchange
rate volatility. Keeping in mind that
e+ = 1 +
(1 − e−)(1 − π)
π
,
π → 1− results in e+ → 1+ and lower volatility as well. The embezzle-
ment is less proﬁtable, and the inducement for the choice of the good
project need not be as high.THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCIAL MATCHING 13
Whoever investor backs the project (foreign or domestic), the “bribe”
secure a partial denomination asset-liability matching and protects
from outright fraud.
Let ¯ A be the threshold of inside equity level necessary for the project
to gets oﬀ the ground:
¯ A = I − 2p +
p(1 − π)(1 − e−)
p − 1/2
.
The interesting case for us is ¯ A ≥ 0, which implies that the NPV of the
good project is bounded above by the moral hazard avoiding payment
2p − I <
p(1 − π)(1 − e−)
p − 1/2
.
The lesson is immediate: the easier to get partial matching, or equiv-
alently, the lower the risk of fraudulent mismatches, the lower the min-
imum capitalization required, a valid result even if obtained in an en-
vironment a bit extreme (not all mismatches are plain embezzlement).
3.3. Intermediation, denomination matching, and inside eq-
uity. Although a full ﬂedged model of intermediation to tackle our
issues is not trivial, its motivation is easy in this framework. We follow
closely the lead of Holmstr¨ om-Tirole [1997].
As the result of active monitoring at a cost of c, the “bribe” is reduced
to a fraction q reﬂecting an undetected level of fraud. Thus the private
beneﬁt of the poor technology is
b =
qp(1 − π)(1 − e−)
p − 1/2
.
The intermediary also faces moral hazard, and it has to be paid to








We envision a ﬁnancial intermediation sector competitive, where in-
termediaries contribute with their own capital, called “informed cap-
ital”11 to their borrowers, to ameliorate their own moral hazard. To
make a consistent story, their investment portfolio cannot be perfectly
diversiﬁed, otherwise, capital would not be needed, and they would
never go bust. Although an extreme assumption, it is assumed perfect
positive correlation of all intermediary’s investments.
Let Im be the intermediary’s capital and β its rate return. Since
monitoring is costly, then β > 1, i.e., its return must be higher than
11While so far we have as a external ﬁnance I − A, also called “uninformed
capital”.14 EDUARDO SIANDRA





Alternatively, we can write Im(β) = pc/((p − 1/2)β).




q(1 − e−)(1 − π) + c
p − 1/2

≥ I − A − Im(β),
and the threshold level
¯ A(β) = I − Im(β) − p

2 −




If the collateral of ﬁrm does not reach ¯ A(β), it cannot get uninformed
capital12. As intuitive, the threshold is increasing in β.
What is the lowest possible equilibrium rate β? To pin down that we
resort to the condition that the surplus of the intermediary must yield
the rate of return of the storage technology available to the uniformed
investors:
pc/(p − 1/2) − c = Im(β) = pc/((p − 1/2)β),
hence, β = 2p > 1, which is also the case here. For intermediation to
be socially useful, it has to improve the access of strongly net worth
constrained to uninformed capital:
¯ A(2p) ≤ ¯ A) ⇒ c < 2p(1 − π)(1 − e−)(1 − q),
that is, for c small enough.
For ﬁrms with inside equity in the mid range, ¯ A(β) ≤ A ≤ ¯ A),
has a mix of funding of informed and uninformed capital. One possi-
ble interpretation is that uninformed investors are “depositors” in the
intermediary.
If the distribution of inside equity is given by probability distribution
G(A), the aggregate demand for informed capital is
Dm(β) = (G( ¯ A)) − G( ¯ A(β)))Im(β),
decreasing in β. The credit market equilibrium with exogenous supply
is Km = Dm(β)
Notice that the presence of ﬁnancial intermediaries is associated with
poorer endowed inside equity ﬁrms, i.e., higher leverages. In this very
special analytical example, intermediaries made less costly for ﬁrms to
keep the more matched position. Of course, it is possible, and worth
exploring other possibilities.
12Informed capital is too costly to make up for the lack of uninformed capitalTHE ECONOMICS OF FINANCIAL MATCHING 15
Conclusion
In this short paper we try to place ﬁnancial matching in a broader
framework of ﬁnancial economics and outline something akin to a pre-
liminary agenda for future work.
We explore the links of matching with collateral, leverage, the role
of capital in ﬁnancial and non ﬁnancial ﬁrms, contract and security
design, ﬁnancial innovation, risk shifting among sectors and other re-
lated concepts. We pointed out its relevance for ﬁnancial regulation
and public policy.
Without attempting any survey, we summarize in more detail two
diﬀerent frameworks germane to ﬁnancial matching: the stylized GE
models with incomplete markets and corporate ﬁnance incentive mod-
els. Both have strengths and weaknesses.
In a simple model corporate governance model we produce a simple
analytical example of the relation between asset-liability denomination
matching, leverage, and inside equity. We think this modelling has
much potential to carry out this paper agenda.
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